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environment with international investment. At the same time, a modified version of the 
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balancing countries' external and internal pecuniary externalities. 
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A common caveat overshadows much of the debate about the role of negotiated tari® lib-
eralization as a solution to a terms of trade driven prisoners' dilemma: standard models
cannot address the potential for international investment to in°uence governments' pref-
erences over trade policies. It seems likely that an us-versus-them mercantilist framework
for understanding the governance of international market access may be incomplete in an
age when countries' entrepreneurial interests extend beyond their own borders and locally
operated enterprizes are not necessarily locally owned.
The common trait across virtually all forms of cross-border investment { whether the
acquisition of domestic ¯rms by foreign interests, foreign direct investment (FDI), multi-
nationals' foreign a±liate activities, international portfolio diversi¯cation, or cross-country
mergers { is that the pattern of international ownership is divorced from countries' domestic
production portfolios. The critical implication is that international investment { however
broadly de¯ned { constitutes non-trade economic integration across countries, and thus al-
lows countries' gross domestic product (GDP) to di®er in both level and composition from
gross national product (GNP). Since it is generally held that countries' welfare is tied more
closely to GNP than to GDP, this simple observation carries considerable importance for
governments' trade policy objectives.
This paper evaluates how the conventional understanding of pecuniary cost-shifting
between countries must be updated in an environment with internationally integrated equity
markets, and how this may translate into an altered role for multilateral trade agreements
such as the General Agreement on Tari®s and Trade and its successor institution, the
World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO). To this end, the work combines a simple model
of endogenous tari® determination under international cross-ownership with the Bagwell
and Staiger (1999) (2002) politically augmented terms of trade framework to reexamine the
role of negotiated tari® liberalization in an environment with international investment. To
capture the policy implications of the broadest possible range of international investment
mechanisms in a single framework, the paper restricts attention to the ownership e®ect
2of investment globalization.1 Given the broad view of international investment adopted
here, the terms international ownership, cross-border ownership, and international equity
holdings, may be taken to be equivalent hereafter.
The model reveals that international ownership dramatically restructures the relation-
ship between national welfare and prices. Whereas traditional (national ownership) models
admit a single pecuniary externality through which large countries may extract rents from
foreign trading partners, models with international ownership permit three potential cost-
shifting margins. In addition to (potentially) severing the traditionally understood link
between a country's terms of trade and its welfare, cross-border ownership introduces two
previously unrecognized (potential) cost-shifting margins: the absolute (local relative to
world) price level, which can be used to shift rents from local producers (which may be
partially foreign owned) to local consumer-constituents, and the local relative price, which
may be manipulated to shift rents across sectors { away from those with a relatively high
degree of foreign ownership and toward those that are more provincially owned. By for-
mally de¯ning and disentangling these price to welfare mappings, the paper both develops
a uni¯ed framework for evaluating the trade policy implications of international investment
and yields a taxonomy of how the pattern of cross-border ownership in°uences government
objectives and thus the role of negotiated trade agreements.
Incorporating international investment into conventional economic models ranks an
increasingly important task as global equity markets become more integrated. The World
Bank estimates that between 1990 and 2003, gross private capital °ows (the sum of the
absolute values of direct, portfolio, and other investment in°ows and out°ows recorded
in the balance of payments) as a percentage of GDP rose from 2.8 to 4.6 in low-income
countries, from 6.7 to 13.2 in middle-income countries, and from 11.1 to 26.6 in high-
income countries.2 This trend towards internationally integrated equity markets has not
gone unnoticed. In a series of research projects spanning the trade and international ¯nance
1This generality comes at a cost, of course, since any economic e®ects of investment beyond the impact
on the pattern of international ownership are necessarily overlooked. For an examination of export-platform
international investment as a physical capital °ow, see Blanchard (2005a).
2World Bank, World Development Indicators 2005, Section 6.1, Table 6.1.
3literatures, a number of papers have explored various implications of foreign factor °ows or
asset market diversi¯cation for welfare and trade policy.
The related work within the international trade literature focuses almost exclusively on
the welfare and policy implications of international investment (typically modelled as FDI)
from the investment-host country perspective, e®ectively restricting attention to the local {
or internal { e®ects of international ownership. Though these papers cluster around several
distinct issues: the welfare e®ects of foreign capital in°ows taking tari® policies as ¯xed,3
the potential for \tari® jumping" direct investment,4 and the political economy implications
of foreign-owned local enterprizes,5 they share a common policy implication in the context
of this paper. Whether or not explicitly derived, each study implies that a government's
optimal tari® (which provides a net transfer from consumers to producers) should decrease
with the level of foreign ownership in the host country; intuitively, the local government
has less incentive to protect local industry that is owned in part by foreigners.
A pair of innovative articles from the international ¯nance literature examine the pol-
icy implications of international equity integration through the lens of asset markets. By
focussing on the e®ect of a country's overseas asset holdings as a part of national ownership,
these papers evaluate the external e®ect of international portfolio diversi¯cation. Stockman
and Dellas (1986) and Devereux and Lee (1999) explore the welfare and tari® policy im-
plications of internationally integrated asset markets in the presence of risk.6 Both papers
identify the potential for international ownership to break the link between terms of trade
and welfare (as so eloquently stated by Stockman and Dellas), but modelling restrictions in
3See, for example, Uzawa (1969), Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro (1977), Bhagwati and Brecher (1980)
(1981), and Brecher and Findlay (1983).
4The foundational paper is Bhagwati, Brecher, Dinopoulos, and Srinivasan (1987); a nice review of sub-
sequent research may be found in Bhagwati, Dinopoulos, and Wong (1992). An interesting recent extension
in Konishi, Saggi, and Weber (1999) uses the notion of quid pro quo FDI to explain the use of VERs.
5Grossman and Helpman (1996), Olarreaga (1999), Neto (2002), and Blanchard (2002), examine the
implications of local foreign ownership on a host government's optimal trade policy using various incarnations
of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) `Protection for Sale' model.
6The former explores the e®ect of exogenous political risk on optimal asset allocation and ex-post national
welfare under various (exogenous) tari® policy outcomes, while the latter examines the impact of diversi¯ed
asset markets on the outcome of a Nash tari® war between two large countries.
4each paper prohibit simultaneous consideration of the internal e®ects of ownership, resulting
in some potentially misleading (or at least signi¯cantly quali¯ed) policy predictions.
While the key elements of existing work are qualitatively consistent with the model to
be presented here, each constitutes only part of the story. In contrast, this paper adopts
a uni¯ed approach by constructing a generalized model that permits any pattern of in-
ternational cross-ownership, allows virtually any domestic political economy motives to
underly government objectives, and generates policy and welfare predictions for both the
investment-host and investment-source countries simultaneously.
In a pedagogical ¯rst step, the ¯rst part of the paper develops a simple two-country
two-good general equilibrium model to demonstrate how the pattern of international own-
ership enters a national income maximizing government's optimal tari® function. First,
assuming that the pattern of international ownership is industry-neutral (equal ownership
shares across sectors), the model identi¯es two distinct channels through which cross bor-
der ownership a®ects governments' optimal tari®s. The ¯rst, termed the internal e®ect,
encompasses ¯ndings from the related trade literature { that a government's optimal tari®
decreases with its recognition of the degree of foreign ownership of local industry. The
second, the external e®ect, generalizes the ¯nding from international ¯nance, and demon-
strates that the government has less incentive to manipulate the terms of trade when its
constituents hold a stake in the foreign economy.
A brief extension to the basic model then introduces the potential for compositional
e®ects by allowing the inter-sectoral composition of foreign ownership to vary from the
industry-neutral benchmark. The thought experiment highlights the potential for sectoral
bias in ownership patterns to induce governments to further manipulate prices in favor
of those industries with a (relatively) greater degree of national ownership. For instance,
foreign ownership bias towards the import-competing sector would strengthen the inter-
nal e®ect in the host country, while weakening the external e®ect for the foreign (source)
country.
This basic version of the model implies that given any equilibrium pattern of produc-
tion, trade, and prices, both governments' optimal tari®s decline with their recognition of
5the degree of (industry-neutral) international equity integration. Indeed, there may ex-
ist su±ciently integrated patterns of international investment that lead both countries to
choose internationally e±cient tari®s (or even free trade) unilaterally. Interestingly, the
e±ciency inducing pattern of international cross-ownership falls short of complete portfolio
diversi¯cation, contrary to an earlier ¯nding by Devereux and Lee (1999). This contradic-
tion highlights the important but potentially surprising role of the internal e®ect, which
in their model is implicitly ruled out by assumptions. Thus, while the generalized model
developed in this paper supports Devereux and Lee's qualitative conclusion that opening
¯nancial markets may supply a substantial \trade" welfare gain through more liberal tari®
regimes, the exercise also emphasizes the ¯nding that perfect portfolio diversi¯cation cannot
ensure globally e±cient tari®s.
Findings from the basic version of the model suggest more generally that the conven-
tional understanding of pecuniary externalities among trading parters must be updated in
an environment with internationally integrated equity markets. The model reveals that
(i) large countries' ownership interests overseas may mitigate (or even reverse) the conven-
tionally understood link between terms of trade and welfare that would otherwise lead the
government to set ine±ciently high tari®s (the external e®ect), (ii) foreign ownership in
the local economy introduces an internal cost-shifting externality through which govern-
ments can extract rents from foreign investors by manipulating the absolute (local relative
to world) price level (the internal e®ect), and (iii) sectoral bias in the pattern of ownership
presents an incentive for governments to further manipulate prices in favor of nationally
owned industries (the compositional e®ect), which may temper or strengthen the internal
and external e®ects depending on the intersectoral distribution of ownership locally and
abroad. Although these three e®ects of international ownership are ¯rst identi¯ed under
the narrow assumption that governments are national income maximizers, it seems evident
that observations (i) ¡ (iii) should extend to a broad class of political economy models.
Using Bagwell and Staiger's (1999) (2002) politically augmented terms of trade frame-
work, the second half of the paper uses the observations outlined above to formalize several
caveats to the prevailing economic theory of the GATT/WTO in an environment with
6cross-border ownership. First, by eroding large countries' external terms of trade cost-
shifting motives, international ownership potentially could release countries from the terms
of trade driven prisoners' dilemma that would otherwise necessitate negotiated tari® re-
ductions. This carries the provocative implication that increasingly integrated patterns of
international ownership could { at least in theory { substitute for negotiated tari® liberal-
ization in inducing e±cient tari® regimes, and thereby supplant completely the current role
of the GATT/WTO. Moreover, since foreign ownership introduces an internal cost-shifting
opportunity for expropriative policy manipulation that may induce countries to set inef-
¯ciently low tari®s, su±cient cross-border ownership could potentially reverse the role of
negotiated trade agreements { shifting from an institutional structure designed to facilitate
reciprocal tari® liberalization to one that helps countries cooperatively raise their tari®s
to globally e±cient levels. Yet importantly, the basic principle of reciprocity still serves as
an important guide to e±cient tari® negotiations regardless of whether unilaterally optimal
tari®s are above or below globally e±cient levels; countries can achieve Pareto welfare gains
by adjusting tari®s in lock-step. It is simply that the formal de¯nition of reciprocal tari®
liberalization must be updated in the presence of international ownership { from the exist-
ing understanding of reciprocity as symmetric market access concessions to an adjustment
process that balances countries' external and internal ownership positions together with the
traditionally de¯ned terms of trade.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section develops a model to identify the inter-
nal, external, and compositional e®ects of international ownership on national income maxi-
mizing governments' optimal tari®s and argues that there may exist patterns of international
investment that are su±ciently integrated to induce countries to choose internationally ef-
¯cient tari®s (or even free trade) unilaterally. Section 3 then explores the implications of
international portfolio integration for the GATT/WTO by formalizing how cross-ownership
rede¯nes pecuniary externalities among large countries, and how these changes may be for-
malized in the Bagwell-Staiger politically augmented terms of trade framework. Section 4
concludes.
72 Cost-shifting and International Investment
This section develops a simple two-country two-good general equilibrium model with ex-
ogenous international cross-ownership. Governments are assumed to be apolitical national
income maximizers; this simpli¯cation o®ers a clear characterization of the optimal tari® as
the sum of the standard large country terms of trade cost-shifting externality, an internal
e®ect (how foreign ownership of local production in°uences tari® choice), and an external
e®ect (how domestic ownership of overseas production a®ects the optimal tari® decision).
Later, Section 3 argues that the results from this section extend qualitatively to a broad
class of (potentially politically motivated) government objectives.
2.1 The Model
Two large countries, Home and Foreign, may produce and trade 2 goods, x and y, with
constant returns to scale technologies and under the assumption of increasing opportu-
nity costs. Preferences are assumed to be identical and homothetic (the assumptions on
preferences are necessary only for the discussion of reciprocity in Appendix 5.4).
International ownership is modelled as non-resident claims on domestic production,
which is paid the local output price.7 De¯ning international ownership as a claim on output
rather than on the return to a given factor of production simpli¯es analysis considerably,
since the rate of return to foreign owners is then homogenous of degree one in the local
price.8 The pattern of international ownership is taken to be exogenous so that the model
can remain agnostic regarding the mechanism through which such bilateral cross-holdings
arise { whether via international capital °ows, acquisition of domestic ¯rms by foreigners,
7The assumption that the return to overseas investment depends on the foreign local price is consistent
with Bhagwati and Brecher (1980) and Neary (1995) for example, and re°ects that trade taxes are levied
on goods based on location of production rather than ownership.
8If instead international ownership was modelled as non-resident claims on the return to one of several
factors of production (such as capital), the magnitude (but not the direction) of a change in the local price
on foreign remittances would depend on the proportion of the price change absorbed by other factors of
production (such as labor). In e®ect, modelling foreign ownership as a claim on output may be understood
as a reduced form of modelling foreign factor ownership.
8international portfolio diversi¯cation, or some other means.9
Denote the percentage of Home production of good i 2 fx;yg held in Foreign claims
by Ái. Similarly, use Á¤
i to represent the percentage of claims on Foreign located industry
i production held by Home residents. Attention is restricted to industry neutral patterns
of international ownership, for which Áx = Áy ´ Á and Á¤
x = Á¤
y ´ Á¤. (This assumption
is relaxed temporarily later in the section to explore the compositional e®ects of industry
bias in ownership patterns.) So de¯ned, Á and Á¤ measure international equity integration;
the higher is Á (Á¤), the greater the proportion of Home (Foreign) production owned by
non-residents. From the perspective of the Home government, Á designates internal foreign
ownership, and Á¤ external ownership of production overseas.
Governments are restricted to a single trade policy instrument in the form of import
tari®s. In standard models without international ownership this is simply a privilege af-
forded by Lerner symmetry. Here, however, this constitutes an explicit assumption since
import tari®s and export taxes may have asymmetric e®ects on the real economy in the
presence of cross-border asset holdings, as demonstrated in Blanchard (2005b).10 Since this
paper's focus is to explore the implications of international ownership for the GATT/WTO
{ an institution designed explicitly for the cooperative reduction of tari®s { the restricted
instrument set seems most appropriate.
Let good y act as numeraire such that p ´
px
py represents Home's local price ratio. Using









py, and the Home (Foreign) terms of trade is 1
pw (pw). Using t (t¤) to represent
the Home (Foreign) ad valorem import tari®, each country's domestic relative price may
9Though taking international ownership as exogenous constitutes rather a heroic simpli¯cation of the
model, it is well precedented. For example, Bhagwati and Brecher (1981) assume ¯xed supplies of foreign
inputs, but argue convincingly that their model nonetheless provides a meaningful caution to nationally
oriented policy makers not to automatically adopt the standard welfare conclusions about trade policies in
an environment with international ownership.
10Tari®s increase the local absolute (home relative to world) price level, which shifts rents from consumers
to producers, whereas export taxes cause the absolute price level to fall, bene¯tting consumers at the expense
of producers.
9then be written a function of the world price and the local tari®, p = ¿pw ´ p(¿;pw) and
p¤ =
pw
¿¤ ´ p¤(¿¤;pw) where ¿ ´ (1 + t) and ¿¤ ´ (1 + t¤).
Production occurs at the point on each country's production possibilities frontier where
the marginal rate of technical substitution equals the domestic price ratio; it follows that
Home (Foreign) production of each good i may be written as a function of the local relative
price only, qi(p) (q¤
i (p¤)) for i 2 fx;yg. Assuming Gorman form preferences ensures that
aggregate Home (Foreign) demand for each good depends on only local prices and national
income, I (I¤), so that di ´ di(p;I) and d¤
i ´ d¤
i(p¤;I¤) for i 2 fx;yg.
Expressed in units of the local export good measured at the world price, the Home
and Foreign income levels I(p;pw;p¤) and I¤(p;pw;p¤) are determined implicitly by the
respective equations:11
I = (1 ¡ Á)[pqx(p) + qy(p)] + Á¤¿¤[p¤q¤
x(p¤) + q¤
y(p¤)] (2.1)
+ (p ¡ pw)[dx(p;I) ¡ qx(p)]
and,


























Notice that these income expressions represent gross national product (GNP) rather than
gross domestic product (GDP) since they incorporate remittances from abroad and pay-
ments to foreigners.
11The real income expressions in (2.1) and (2.2) are derived by dividing Home and Foreign money income,
I
m and I















¤)] + (px ¡ p
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x)[dx(p;I) ¡ qx(p)]; and
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Note that under the arbitrage conditions, ¿
¤ =
pw
p¤ and ¿ =
p




10Both countries are assumed to satisfy their respective balanced budget conditions:12
pwMx = Ey + ©; and (2.3)
M¤
y = pwE¤
x ¡ ©; (2.4)
where © ´ Á¤¿¤[p¤q¤
x + q¤
y] ¡ Á[pqx + qy] represents net remittances paid by Foreign to
Home measured in units of good y at the world price;13 Mx(p;I) ´ dx(p;I)¡qx(p) denotes









The equilibrium world price, ~ pw ´ ~ pw(¿;¿¤), is determined by the goods market clearing
condition:
E¤
x(p(¿; ~ pw); ~ pw;p¤(¿¤; ~ pw)) = Mx(p(¿; ~ pw); ~ pw;p¤(¿¤; ~ pw)): (2.5)
By Walras' law, the market for y must also clear if the preceding holds and countries abide









d¿¤ < 0 <
@~ pw(¿;¿¤)
@¿¤ : (2.7)
12The balanced budget conditions in (2.3) and (2.4) are found by setting the value of each country's
consumption at local prices equal to its money income (i.e. pxdx+pydy = I






for Foreign), rearranging, and dividing by py.
13By allowing permanent trade imbalances this model di®ers from most, since virtually all international
trade models impose balanced trade (© ´ 0). Yet even the assumption of balanced trade constitutes
an explicit (and often inappropriate) restriction in the presence of international investment; when foreign
remittances depend on local prices (as assumed here), the value of © depends on ¿ and ¿
¤. Indeed, the
assumption of balanced trade is doubly restrictive when trade policy is endogenous, since national income
maximizing governments have an incentive to manipulate domestic prices to engineer trade de¯cits at the
expense of foreign investors, as ¯rst shown by Blanchard (2005b).
112.2 Optimal Tari®s and the Pattern of International Ownership
Home's Optimal Tari®. The Home government chooses its tari® to maximize the indirect
utility of a representative consumer subject to the market clearing condition (2.5), where




s.t. pw = ~ pw(¿;¿¤):
Forming the Lagrangian restates the government's problem:
max
¿;pw L = v(p(¿;pw);I(p(¿;pw);pw;p¤(¿¤;pw))) ¡ °(pw ¡ ~ pw(¿;¿¤)); (2.9)
where ° > 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier. After straightforward algebraic manipulation,


























The expression in (2.10) reveals that there are three competing in°uences on the gov-
ernment's optimal tari® decision: the standard large country terms of trade motive to set
a positive tari®, the e®ect of Home's external ownership of Foreign production, and the
in°uence of internal Foreign ownership of Home's local production. Notice that the exter-
nal e®ect is driven by Home's ownership in the Foreign export sector, whereas the internal
e®ect depends on the degree of Foreign ownership in Home's import sector. This is intu-
itive. To the extent that Home constituents hold equity interests the Foreign export sector,
their government will be less inclined to levy an import tari® at their expense; the greater
14Care must be taken to evaluate the derivative of Home's income expression, since ¯xing any two of the
¯ve variables p; ~ p
w;p
¤;¿; and ¿
¤ determines uniquely the equilibrium values of the remaining three. For
instance, since p
¤ is determined uniquely by p and ~ p
w, the e®ect of a marginal change in p
¤ on income





can be evaluated only by allowing p
w to di®er from its market clearing
value, ~ p
w. See Section 3 for a more detailed discussion of the equilibrium relationships among prices and
tari®s.
12the proportion of the foreign export sector that Home recognizes as its own, Á¤, the lower
its optimal tari®. Similarly, since a tari® acts as a subsidy to the domestic import sector
at the expense of local consumers, the Home government will have less motive to provide
protection to the import competing industry, the greater is Á.
Solving the ¯rst order condition in (2.10) yields the implicit form of Home's optimal
tari®:








































x is Foreign export supply elasticity. Note that in the absence of international
ownership, (2.11) reduces to the familiar Johnson (1951-52) terms of trade cost-shifting
tari®, ¿ = 1+ 1
²¤
x.15 XThis optimal tari® expression reinforces the earlier intuition, since it is
again clear that the internal and external e®ects of international ownership work in tandem
to counter Home's `standard' large-country terms of trade motivation for manipulating the
world price. And indeed, as long as the direct e®ect of increasing the degree of cross-
ownership (how Á and Á¤ enter (2.11) explicitly) outweighs any possible indirect e®ects of
changing the pattern of international ownership16 (which are generally ambiguous in sign),
an increase in industry-neutral international integration will cause Home's optimal tari® to
fall.
At the same time, it is clear that the tari® liberalizing potential of international owner-
ship must in general depend crucially on the trade orientation of those sectors with foreign
stake holders. Temporarily removing the the restriction of industry neutrality yields the
modi¯ed optimal tari® expression:










































16Changing Á and Á
¤ may a®ect equilibrium trade volume and foreign export supply elasticity via income
e®ects.
13The compositional e®ects identi¯ed above describe the potential for industry-bias in the pat-
tern of international ownership to further in°uence Home's optimal tari®. Export-sector bias
in Home's overseas ownership (Á¤
x > Á¤
y), would further reduce Home's incentive to manip-
ulate the terms of trade, while ownership bias towards the foreign import-competing sector
(Á¤
y > Á¤
x) would counter the `direct' in°uence of the external e®ect. Similarly, while a For-
eign ownership bias towards Home's import-competing sector (Áx > Áy) would strengthen
the internal e®ect on Home's tari®, disproportionate Foreign ownership in Home's export
sector would enter the Home optimal tari® function with the opposite sign.
Intuitively, any change in local relative prices, which causes the pattern of domestic
output to shift along a country's production possibilities frontier, redistributes returns be-
tween industries. To the extent that there exists industry-bias in the pattern of ownership,
this implies a net redistribution between domestic and foreign producers. Thus, as demon-
strated by (2.12), any industry bias in the pattern of ownership will either moderate or
further strengthen the `direct' internal and external e®ects depending on the direction of
bias. In the context of this model, the internal and external e®ects of international owner-
ship will swamp any potential compositional e®ects as long as the pattern of ownership is
not too heavily biased towards sector y. To simplify exposition and notation, the remainder
of the paper now re-invokes the assumption of industry-neutral ownership.
The Foreign Optimal Tari®. The Foreign economy mirrors that of Home, where y is
the Foreign import sector and the Home country's export sector. The full characterization
of the Foreign government's optimization problem is reserved for the appendix, since it
exactly parallels that for Home. Jumping directly to the result, it is clear that the implicit
expression for the Foreign optimal tari® is analogous to (2.11):









































is Home's elasticity of export supply. Again, in the absence of cross ownership this reduces
to the standard Johnson cost-shifting tari®.
14Just as in the Home country case, both internal (Á¤) and external (Á) cross-holdings en-
ter the Foreign optimal tari® expression negatively. All else equal, the Foreign government's
incentive to impose a tari® decreases both with the fraction of the local import-competing
sector owned by Home constituents, Á¤q¤
y, and with the share of Home's export sector owned
by Foreigners, Áqy. Thus, given any equilibrium pattern of production, trade volume, and
Foreign export supply elasticity, the Foreign country's optimal tari® is lower, the greater
the degree of international integration.
The tari® liberalizing potential of international ownership carries a number of policy
implications. For instance, the external e®ect of overseas ownership introduces the possibil-
ity that by welcoming investment from a trading partner, a country may be able to induce
the investing country to reduce its import tari®s unilaterally. This is a previously uniden-
ti¯ed bene¯t of attracting overseas investors; in addition to conventionally cited gains such
as capital growth, employment, or technology transfer, foreign investment in the local ex-
port sector can improve existing domestic exporters' market access in the investment-source
country.17
At the same time, the internal e®ect of international investment admits an intriguing
reinterpretation of Bhagwati, Brecher, Dinopoulos, and Srinivasan (1987), which argues
that foreign export-oriented ¯rms may establish import-competing subsidiaries in a target
country in an e®ort to jump an existing tari® or to defuse a protectionist threat. The
authors posit that such tari®-jumping foreign investment may reduce the host country's
tari® due to \political goodwill" on the part of local politicians who appreciate the job
creation that follows from subsidiary investment. This model justi¯es their assumption
that an increase in local foreign investment causes the host-country tari® to decline, but
it is not political goodwill that reduces the host-country tari®. Quite the opposite, the
investment host government has an incentive to decrease its tari® to extract rents from
foreign investors in the local import competing sector. More generally, if foreign investors
earn excess returns, there exists an internal cost-shifting opportunity whereby the local
17Blanchard (2005a) explores this possibility further by asking whether potential investment-host countries
should in fact subsidize foreign direct investment to gain such preferential tari® treatment.
15government can manipulate local prices through tari® reductions to extract rents from
foreign interests in the local import sector.
2.3 E±ciency Inducing Patterns of Ownership
Perhaps the model's most provocative suggestion is that by leading governments to liberalize
their tari®s unilaterally, international integration may be able to substitute partially (or in
some instances completely) for negotiated tari® reductions. Just as in any standard (no-
FDI) model with national income maximizing governments, the set of e±cient tari®s is




(Proof in appendix 5.2) Substituting the optimal tari® expressions (2.11) and (2.13) into
the e±ciency condition (2.14) de¯nes implicitly a set of (Á;Á¤) pairs for which the outcome
of a Nash tari® war between Home and Foreign would be internationally e±cient. It is not
surprising given the model's generality that the resulting e±ciency condition yields little
economic insight. Analytically simpler than a general characterization of the conditions for
e±ciency, the free trade case (su±cient but not necessary) yields better insight with fewer
complications.
Setting Home's optimal tari® expression in (2.11) equal to one and rearranging de¯nes




























Together, (2.15) and (2.16) de¯ne a free trade inducing pattern of international ownership
(Áft;Á¤ft) that counters exactly the Home and Foreign countries' standard large country
motive to manipulate the world price. Of course, there is no reason to expect existence or
uniqueness of such a free trade inducing pattern of ownership in general due to the implicit
nature of the problem.
16Notice in both countries that in the absence of internal ownership each government's
optimal tari® is zero when the volume of its overseas owned production equals its import
volume (e.g. in Home, when Á = 0;¿0 = 1 when q¤
xÁ¤ = E¤
x). This is intuitive; when a
country owns overseas exactly as much as it imports (and owns all of its local production),
it is neither a net consumer nor a net producer of that good, and thus has no incentive to
manipulate the world price. Or in other words, perfect portfolio diversi¯cation breaks the
link between a country's terms of trade and its welfare, as shown ¯rst by Stockman and
Dellas (1986). But importantly, if there also is internal ownership so that foreign investors
hold some claim to local production, that same level of external ownership will induce a
negative tari®, since the internal e®ect excites the government's expropriative inclinations.
If tari®s are the government's only policy instrument as assumed here, the result is an import
subsidy. Were more direct means by which to capture foreign investors rents available { for
instance through a tax on foreign remittances { the government's ¯rst best policy instead
would be a direct tax on remittances, removing the internal cost-shifting e®ect from the
optimal tari® decision.18
Interestingly, this implies that any e±ciency inducing pattern of industry-neutral own-
ership would necessarily fall short of complete portfolio diversi¯cation. At ¯rst glance, this
seems to contradict a ¯nding by Devereux and Lee (1999), who found that free trade is
a Nash equilibrium of a tari® war when international ¯nancial markets are fully diversi-
¯ed.19 The contradiction derives from a critical di®erence in model assumptions. Devereux
and Lee's framework, which develops a parameterized two country of optimal ¯nancial risk
sharing to show that if tari®s are determined optimally by national income maximizing
governments, implicity rules out internal cost shifting by assuming that return to overseas
investment is una®ected by local tari®s; this leaves only terms of trade motives to drive trade
18See Blanchard (2005b) for formal treatment of tari®s as a second best instrument for expropriating
foreign investors' returns.
19Under complete diversi¯cation and starting from free trade, each country will consume as much as it
owns in each industry (recall that preferences are identical and homothetic). Thus, starting from free trade





x + Áqx. But comparing this expression to the free trade
requirement in (2.15) reveals that Home's optimal tari® will be zero when it is completely diversi¯ed if and
only if Á = 0. But if Á = 0 and Á
¤ > 0 the foreign optimal tari® will be negative by (2.13).
17policy.20 Absent the internal e®ects of international ownership, this model thus presents a
generalized version of theirs. More generally, the results outlined here qualitatively support
their conclusion that when tari®s are endogenous, opening ¯nancial markets can supply a
secondary trade welfare gain in addition to the direct bene¯t of risk-sharing.
Building on the ¯nding that international equity integration can serve as a tari® liber-
alizing force in a model with apolitical national income maximizing governments, the next
section argues that this observation extends to a broad class of government objectives, and
discusses the implications for the prevailing economic interpretation of the GATT/WTO in
an environment with international ownership.
3 Achieving E±ciency: Negotiation vs. Integration
Multilateral trade forums are understood increasingly to be a solution to a terms of trade
driven prisoners' dilemma among large economies;21 su±ciently large countries can engineer
their local trade policies to manipulate world prices in their favor, but when every country
follows a unilaterally optimal policy of using tari®s to achieve terms of trade gains, their
competing e®orts to in°uence the world price will cancel one another (given su±cient sym-
metry) leaving only the local distortionary e®ects of protectionism. Although every country
could be made better o® under universally lower tari®s, none will liberalize unilaterally for
fear of the consequent damage to its terms of trade.
Bagwell and Staiger (2002) construct a theoretical framework to formalize this in-
sight, and in so doing articulate a comprehensive economic interpretation the role of the
20Speci¯cally, Devereux and Lee develop a two-period model in which two symmetric countries with
Cobb-Douglas preferences trade state contingent contracts in the ¯rst period for second period delivery and
consumption. There is no production and second period endowments follow a stochastic process that is
ex-ante symmetric across countries (so that countries' ex-ante budget constraints are identical). Critically,
the authors assume that second period deliveries exempt from stage two tari®s, which eliminates the internal
cost-shifting motive identi¯ed here.
21Other theories of negotiated tari® liberalization, for instance as commitment devices for time-inconsistent
governments (i.e. Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998) and Ornelas (2002)), are set aside in this paper.
Whether international investment can substitute for multilateral agreements as a time consistent commit-
ment mechanism seems an interesting topic for future work.
18GATT/WTO and its rules. A key innovation of their work is the observation that virtually
any government policy objectives may be characterized as function of the local price and
the equilibrium terms of trade. Thus, they show that in a two country model, government
objectives may be written:
W ´ W(p; ~ pw); (3.1)
W¤ ´ W¤(p¤; ~ pw): (3.2)
Bagwell and Staiger argue that representing government preferences in this way admits
a ready interpretation of the GATT/WTO while maintaining great latitude governments'
redistributional concerns or ideological preferences.22 They impose a single restriction on
the objective functions: that holding the local price ¯xed, government welfare increases
with the country's terms of trade (i.e. W~ pw < 0 and W¤
~ pw > 0 where Home exports the
numeraire good), so that regardless of domestic political objectives, any country su±ciently
large to manipulate the world price has an incentive to do so.
Noting that the Home and Foreign governments' unilaterally optimal tari®s, ¿o and
¿¤o, satisfy the respective ¯rst order conditions:
dW
d¿















< 0 by (2.6)-(2.7), Since ¸ < 0 it must be true that at
the unilaterally optimal tari® Wp < 0. That is, the Home government's unilaterally optimal
tari® is higher than it would be in the absence of terms of trade concerns. (Given the sym-
metry of the problem, the same is true for the foreign counterpart: the Foreign unilaterally
optimal tari® is higher than it would be in the absence of terms of trade concerns.) From
these ¯rst order conditions, Bagwell and Staiger make three observations concerning the
22Since it imposes no restrictions on government preferences over the local price (holding the terms of
trade ¯xed), this politically augmented terms of trade framework admits a broad class of political economy
models in addition to the traditional case of national income maximizing governments. See Bagwell and
Staiger (1999) or (2002) for further discussion.
19e±ciency of countries' unilaterally optimal (Nash) tari®s.23 They prove that (i) Nash equi-
librium tari®s are ine±cient, (ii) Pareto improving trade negotiations must imply mutual
tari® liberalization (Nash equilibrium tari®s are higher than is e±cient), and (iii) the terms
of trade externality is the only source of international ine±ciency (politically optimal tari®s
are e±cient24).
Together, (i) and (ii) imply that value of a trade agreement lies in governments' ability
to achieve mutual welfare gains via reciprocal trade liberalization. That is, holding the
world price ¯xed, each country can improve its welfare from at least a marginal reduction
in its tari®. The third observation implies that eliminating terms of trade externalities
among large countries (either by making big countries \act small" by simply ignoring the
outside e®ects of their tari® decisions or via synchronized tari® reductions in accordance
with the GATT/WTO principle of reciprocity) is su±cient to ensure e±ciency.
Yet these observations depend crucially on the nature of pecuniary externalities, while
the ¯ndings from the ¯rst part of this paper suggest that the pattern of international owner-
ship can restructure dramatically the economic relationships among countries. International
equity integration may mitigate (or even reverse) terms of trade externalities, while simul-
taneously introducing an internal cost-shifting externality through which governments can
extract rents from foreign investors by manipulating domestic prices. The next paragraphs
identify the internal and external e®ects of international ownership within the Bagwell-
Staiger framework to formalize how international investment recharacterizes potential price
externalities between trading partners, demonstrating the applicability of the observations
from Section 2 to a broad class of political economy models.
Returning to the bilateral model from part one of the paper, relax only the assumption
that governments are national income maximizers; leave everything else unchanged. It is
pedagogically useful to de¯ne the government objective functions in two stages. Though
somewhat unorthodox, this two-step technique introduces an intermediate welfare function
that proves notationally useful in disentangling the welfare e®ects of price changes. In
step one, de¯ne government welfare as a function of tari®s and the world price, absent the
23See Bagwell and Staiger (2002) pp. 23-25, or Propositions 1-3 in Bagwell and Staiger (1999).
24Politically optimal tari®s ¿
PO and ¿
¤PO are de¯ned implicitly by Wp = 0 and W
¤
p¤ = 0 respectively.
20market clearing condition. Then in step two, impose market clearing, pw = ~ pw(¿;¿¤), to
de¯ne the \equilibrium" government objective functions that parallel Bagwell and Staiger's
(3.1) - (3.2).25 That is, ¯rst let
w(p;pw;p¤) ´ w(p(¿;pw);pw;p¤(¿¤;pw)); (3.5)
and
w¤(p;pw;p¤) ´ w¤(p¤(¿¤;pw);pw;p(¿;pw)); (3.6)
represent Home and Foreign welfare respectively, where pw is unrestricted, but arbitrage
conditions maintain that p = ¿pw and ¿¤p¤ = pw. (Note that if Home and Foreign were small
countries, the preceding expressions would also represent the governments' (equilibrium)
objective functions for any given (exogenous) world price.) Since Home and Foreign are
large countries, the equilibrium welfare functions { the governments' objective functions {
must incorporate that each government's tari® choice a®ects the world price. Thus, the
equilibrium government objective functions are given by:










Notice that imposing the market clearing constraint reduces the number of arguments
in the objective functions in (3.7)-(3.8). This is because the market clearing and balanced
budget conditions in (2.3)-(2.5), together with the arbitrage conditions, imply that ¯xing
any two of the ¯ve variables p; ~ pw;p¤;¿; and ¿¤ determines the equilibrium values of the
remaining three when both countries are large.26 For example, choosing any (¿;¿¤) pair
determines equilibrium prices according to ~ pw(¿;¿¤);p(¿; ~ pw(¿;¿¤)), and p¤(¿¤; ~ pw(¿;¿¤)).












26A possible exception is that a (p;p
¤) pair may not determine the other variables uniquely. Under some
(quite specialized) model conditions, the iso-p and iso-p
¤ loci in Figure 1 may coincide such that a given
(p;p
¤) combination may support a locus of Home-Foreign tari® pairs.
21Likewise, any (p; ~ pw) pair uniquely determines the equilibrium values of ¿;¿¤; and p¤. Figure
1 illustrates, where the three depicted iso-price loci pp;pwpw; and p¤p¤ represent respectively
the set of tari® pairs that deliver a given Home, world, and Foreign price level.
Figure 1: The Bagwell-Staiger Representation of Tari®-Price Relationship.
Bagwell and Staiger (1999) exploit these equilibrium price relationships to establish
that any government welfare function that may be written as a function of ¿ and ¿¤ may
be recharacterized as a function of equilibrium local and world prices. It is clear that the
Home and Foreign government objectives still may be written this way in the presence of
international cross-ownership. The in°uence of international integration lies not in how the
government objective functions are written, but in the structure that reasonably may be
imposed on them.
Since any pair of the ¯ve tari®/price variables pins down the remaining three in equi-
librium, it must be true that any pair of Home and world prices pins down the Foreign
local price according to the market clearing and balanced budget conditions according to
p¤ ´ p¤(p; ~ pw).27 Hence, a change in ¿ would cause the foreign price to change according to
27By the same argument, any pair of Foreign and world prices determines the equilibrium Home price















@¿ . Figure 2 illustrates: increasing ¿ while holding
p ¯xed implies changes in both the world price (from pwpw to pwpw0) and the foreign local
price (from p¤p¤ to p¤p¤0). Similarly, the change in ¿ holding ~ pw ¯xed implies movements
in both the Home and Foreign prices (from pp to pp0 and from p¤p¤0 to p¤p¤00, respectively).
Figure 2: Price E®ects of a Tari® Change.
While these changes in the foreign price are of peripheral interest in the Bagwell-Staiger
framework, they are of central concern in an environment with international investment.
When a country's constituents hold claims on overseas production, national welfare is af-
fected not only by changes in the domestic and world prices, but also by changes in the




























































In the absence of international ownership, there is no reason for a government to care
23about its trading partner's tari® or local price level apart from its e®ect on the world price,
so that @w
@p¤ = @w¤
@p = 0. Thus, the assumption that holding the local price ¯xed, both
governments bene¯t from an increase in the terms of trade (i.e. W~ pw < 0 and W¤
~ pw > 0)
constitutes an innocuous (and indeed, the appropriate) assumption for the class of models
that Bagwell and Staiger consider. But when countries hold claims on overseas production
it is clear that W~ pw and W¤
~ pw may be positive, negative, or zero depending on the pattern of
international equity holdings, since changes in the world price (holding the domestic price
¯xed) a®ect each country through both the standard terms of trade mechanism and the
e®ect on the returns to foreign investment.
Returning to Bagwell and Staiger's ¯rst two observations, it is apparent that if the
pattern of international ownership is such that W~ pw = W¤
~ pw = 0, international integration
releases the two countries from the terms of trade driven prisoners' dilemma, so that Nash
equilibrium tari®s will be e±cient (proof in Appendix 5.3). More generally, to the extent
that international integration induces tari® liberalization by reducing the absolute value of
W~ pw and W¤
~ pw, it can serve as a partial substitute for negotiated tari® reductions. Finally, if
the pattern of international investment is such that W~ pw > 0 and W¤
~ pw < 0, Nash equilibrium
tari®s will be ine±ciently low, so that the Pareto improving tari® negotiations would allow
countries to cooperatively raise their tari®s.
International integration also implies, contrary to observation (iii), that terms of trade
externalities are no longer the sole source of international ine±ciency in governments' uni-
lateral tari® choices in the presence of foreign investment. To see this, note that a marginal
change in the Home (Foreign) tari® imposes an externality if W¤




































In the absence of international cross-ownership, the only e®ect of a change in ¿ (¿¤) on
Foreign (Home) welfare is through the world price. With international cross-ownership,
however, the local government can extract rents from foreign investors by manipulating
24the domestic price since international investors' returns are subject to local prices; i.e.
@w¤
@p ; @w
@p¤ 6= 0. This internal cost shifting opportunity adds a second source of international
ine±ciency to countries' unilateral tari® decisions.28 Thus, simply making large govern-
ments \act small" by ignoring all external price e®ects of tari® changes29 cannot ensure
e±cient tari®s in the presence of international investment.
Notably, the basic principle of reciprocity { that both countries can gain from mutual
tari® changes that hold the world price ¯xed { still serves as a guide towards e±ciency in
an environment with international investment. Starting from ine±ciently high (low) Nash
tari®s, a small mutual tari® reduction (increase) that leaves the world price unchanged
provides a Pareto improvement.30 Moreover, if Home and Foreign are symmetric, reciprocal
tari® changes will lead them all the way to the e±cient politically optimal tari®s which
balance countries' internal and external interests.
At the same time, however, the formal de¯nition of a reciprocal tari® change must be
modi¯ed in an environment with international investment. In the Bagwell-Staiger frame-
work, a reciprocal tari® change holds the world price ¯xed if it implies that the change of
each country's import volume equals the value of the change in its export volume. But with
international investment, a mutual tari® change will leave the world price unchanged only
if the implied shift in each country's import volume is equal to the value of the change in
its export volume prorated by any e®ect of the reciprocal tari® change on net remittances.
Intuitively, this modi¯cation is required to avoid potential income e®ects that may follow
28An interesting feature of this internal cost shifting externality is that it is not unique to large countries.
This contrasts the predominant view that small countries' unilaterally optimal tari®s are internationally
e±cient so that they need not be included in multilateral trade negotiations.
29In the Bagwell-Staiger framework, a government is said to \act small" if it makes its optimal tari®
decision under the assumption that
@~ pw(¿;¿¤)
@¿ = 0. Here, \acting small" is taken to mean that neither the
world price, nor the foreign local price is a®ected by the government's tari® choice. That is, here the Home
government would act small by choosing it's tari® so that
@w
@p = 0, which is not e±cient for a large country






@p = 0 is e±cient.)
30Ine±ciently high tari®s are characterized by W~ pw < 0;W
¤
~ pw > 0, which by (3.9)-(3.10) implies that at
Nash equilibrium, Wp < 0 and W
¤
p¤ > 0. Thus, a small reduction in ¿ and ¿
¤ that holds ~ p
w ¯xed raises both
W and W
¤. A parallel argument establishes that a small increase in ¿ and ¿
¤ (which holds ~ p
w ¯xed) from
ine±ciently low Nash tari®s is also Pareto improving.
25mutual tari® changes. Although non-trivial, this point is still something of a technicality;
further discussion is therefore reserved for the appendix.
4 Closing Remarks
This paper identi¯es the tari® liberalizing potential of international equity integration; an
ownership interest in a trading partner's export sector may counter a large country's terms
of trade incentive to manipulate world prices, while foreign ownership in the local import
sector can erode the local government's willingness to maintain tari®s at the expense of
its consumer-constituents. Indeed, a su±ciently integrated pattern of international cross-
ownership may lead a government to set globally e±cient tari®s (or even free trade) unilat-
erally.
By rede¯ning the pecuniary externalities among trading partners, international in-
vestment and the concomitant change in the pattern of global ownership suggests careful
reevaluation of that the prevailing economic interpretation of the GATT/WTO. Since over-
seas ownership may decrease (or even eliminate) terms of trade cost shifting among large
countries, international integration may e®ectively substitute in part or full for negotiated
tari® liberalization in achieving internationally e±cient tari®s. Further, because foreign
ownership introduces an internal cost-shifting externality, simply making large countries
\act small" is no longer su±cient to ensure internationally e±cient tari® regimes in an
environment with international investment. Notably, the basic principle of reciprocity re-
mains a powerful guide to e±cient tari® negotiations, though its formal de¯nition must
be modi¯ed somewhat to account for countries' investments abroad in addition to their
conventional mercantilist interests.
Returning to the title question, does existing international investment and cross-border
ownership make the WTO obsolete? Though theoretically possible, this provocative razor's
edge outcome seems unlikely in practice. The important lesson of the paper is instead simply
that ownership matters, and that this carries important implications for governments' trade
policies and the evolving role of negotiated tari® agreements such as the GATT/WTO.
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285 Appendices
5.1 Derivation of the Foreign Optimal Tari®
The Foreign government chooses its optimal tari® to solve:
¿¤o = argmax
¿¤ v(p¤;I¤(p;pw;p¤)); (5.1)
s.t. pw = ~ pw(¿;¿¤): (5.2)
where Foreign income, I¤(p;pw;p¤), is de¯ned implicitly by (2.2).

































Solving yields the implicit form of the Foreign optimal tari® expression:








































is Home's elasticity of export supply.
5.2 E±cient Tari®s













From the de¯nition of Home and Foreign indirect utility levels, V ´ V (¿;¿¤) and V ¤ ´











































y) ¡ Á(pqx + qy): (5.8)
Cross multiplying and combining terms reveals that the set of Pareto e±cient (¿;¿¤) pairs
with cross-ownership is the familiar Mayer (1981) locus:
tpw = ¡t¤p¤ , p = p¤ , ¿ =
1
¿¤: (5.9)
This is just as common sense would suggest, since the exchange of property rights should
not a®ect the e±cient allocation of resources given identical homothetic preferences.
5.3 Politically Optimal Tari®s are E±cient
This appendix proves that politically optimal tari®s (¿PO;¿¤PO) (de¯ned as the tari® pair
satisfying Wp = 0 and W¤
p¤ = 0) are e±cient. (Note that this also implies that Nash
equilibrium tari®s are e±cient if W~ pw = W¤
~ pw = 0, since if W~ pw = W¤
~ pw = 0 Nash equilibrium
tari®s are politically optimal.)






















31To facilitate algebraic manipulation, it is useful to rewrite the Foreign income expression in (2.2) in


































































































































At (¿PO;¿¤PO), Wp = 0 and W¤
p¤ = 0 so that:


















Substituting (5.16)-(5.19) into (5.11) completes the proof. ¦
5.4 Reciprocity
Bagwell and Staiger (1999) (2002) develop the following formal de¯nition of the principle
of reciprocity:
De¯nition 5.1 A set of tari® changes ¢¿ = (¿1 ¡ ¿0) and ¢¿¤ = (¿¤1 ¡ ¿¤0) conforms
to the principle of reciprocity if the resulting change in the volume of each country's






32Note that (i) it does not matter whether imports are valued at p
w0 or p
w1, and (ii) if (5.20) holds, the
analogous condition holds for Foreign by market clearing.
31where pwi = pw(¿i;¿¤i);Mi
x = Mx(pi(¿i;pwi);pwi) and Ei
y = Ey(pi(¿i;pwi);pwi) for i 2
f0;1g.
From Home's balanced budget condition in (2.3): pw0M0
x = E0
y + ©0 and pw1M1
x =
E1
y + ©1. Substituting into (5.20) and rearranging yields:
(pw1 ¡ pw0)M1
x = ©1 ¡ ©0 or, (5.21)
¢pwM1
x = ¢©; (5.22)
which implies that a reciprocal tari® change (one that o®ers equal market access concessions
in each country, as de¯ned above) leaves the world price unchanged if and only if it also leaves
net remittances unchanged. Recall that the Bagwell-Staiger framework assumes balanced
trade, so that ©0;©1 ´ 0 ! ¢© = 0, which implies that any reciprocal tari® change must
leave the world price unchanged. But here net remittances depend on the world price (recall
that © ´ Á¤(pwq¤
x +¿¤q¤
y)¡Á(¿pwqx +qy)), so that ¢© depends on ¢pw. It is therefore no
longer obvious that a reciprocal tari® change will leave the world price ¯xed. And indeed,
as demonstrated below, this will hold only under very special (and apparently arbitrary)
conditions.
Starting from any ine±cient tari® pair (for which p 6= p¤), a reciprocal tari® change
will a®ect the world price only if it causes one country's budget set to increase more than
the other's, since preferences are identical and homothetic. The national budget sets for
Home and Foreign may be written respectively:
B ´ pwqx + qy + © (5.23)
B¤ ´ pwq¤
x + q¤
y ¡ ©: (5.24)
Thus, starting from any ine±cient tari® pair a reciprocal tari® change will leave pw ¯xed if
and only if ¢B ¡ ¢B¤¯
¯
¢pw=0 = 0, where:
¢B ´ pw¢qx + ¢qy + ¢© (5.25)
¢B¤ ´ pw¢q¤
x + ¢q¤




¢B ¡ ¢B¤ = pw¢qx + ¢qy ¡ pw¢q¤
x + ¢q¤
y; (5.27)
32which de¯nes implicitly the relationship between ¢¿ and ¢¿¤ that would have to hold in
order for ¢pw = 0. But since net remittances are endogenous, ¢©
¯ ¯
¢pw=0 = 0 also de¯nes
implicitly the relationship between ¢¿ and ¢¿¤ that is required to leave net remittances
unchanged given a ¯xed world price. In general there is no reason to expect the reciprocal
tari® relationships implied by ¢B ¡¢B¤¯ ¯
¢pw=0 = 0 and ¢©
¯ ¯
¢pw=0 = 0 to coincide. There
is no reason to expect the current de¯nition of reciprocity to ¯x the world price in the
presence of international investment.
To see this more clearly, consider the e®ect of a marginal reciprocal tari® change on
net remittances and the di®erence between the Home and Foreign budget sets, holding the























d¿ = 0: (5.29)
A new de¯nition of reciprocity is therefore needed to permit governments to change
their tari®s reciprocally while holding the world price ¯xed. The following modi¯ed de¯ni-
tion of reciprocity is designed to serve exactly such a role:
De¯nition 5.2 A set of tari® changes ¢¿ = (¿1 ¡ ¿0) and ¢¿¤ = (¿¤1 ¡ ¿¤0) conforms
to the modi¯ed principle of reciprocity if the resulting change in the volume of each
country's imports is equal to the value of the change in the volume of its exports prorated





y) + (©1 ¡ ©0): (5.30)
It is clear that mutual changes in the Home and Foreign tari®s that conform to this modi¯ed
principle of reciprocity leave the world price ¯xed, since together with Home's balanced
budget condition, (5.30) requires:
¢pwM1
x = 0 ) ¢pw = 0: (5.31)
33Note that the pattern of international ownership is perfectly symmetric such that
¢©
¯ ¯
¢pw=0 = 0, the modi¯ed de¯nition of reciprocity collapses to De¯nition 5.1. More
generally, De¯nition (5.2) requires that any reciprocal tari® change that causes net Foreign
to Home remittances to increase (decrease) by ¢©, must induce a change in the trade vol-
ume of x that is exactly ¢© greater than (less than) the change in the trade volume of
y.
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